lowe Subjects of experience norton ne l k i n Consciousness and the origins of thought p i e rre jacob What minds can do andre gal lo i s The world without, the mind within d. w i l s on Cartesian psychology and physical minds barry maund Colours m i c ha e l dev i t t Coming to our senses sy dney sh oe make r The first-person perspective and other essays m i c ha e l stoc ke r Valuing emotions arda de nke l Object and property e. ri c hard s on Practical reasoning about final ends rob e rt a. ro se nk rantz Substance among other categories paul h e l m Belief policies noah le mo s Intrinsic value ly nne rudde r bake r Explaining attitudes h e nry s. th om s on Massachusetts Institute of Technology re c e nt t i t le s jo sh ua h of f man & gary s. lycan University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill sy dney sh oe make r Cornell University j ud i th j.
lowe and walte r s i nnot t -arm st rong Advisory editors jonathan danc y University of Reading joh n hal dane University of St Andrews g i l b e rt harman Princeton University f rank jac k s on Australian National University w i l l i am g. Boucher (Cambridge, 1998).ĬAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY General editors e.
He has published in Analysis and Philosophical Psychology and contributed to Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, ed. ke i th f rank i sh is Lecturer in Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, The Open University. This book will be valuable for philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists. Topics discussed include the function of conscious thought, the cognitive role of natural language, the relation between partial and flat-out belief, the possibility of active belief formation, and the nature of akrasia, self-deception, and first-person authority. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number of puzzling phenomena and helps to vindicate folk psychology. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term ‘belief ’ refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Mind and Supermind Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. 1.1 Conscious versus non-conscious.ġ.2 Occurrent versus standing-state.ġ.5 Language-involving versus not language-involving.Ģ.1 Conscious versus non-conscious.Ģ.2 Explicit versus non-explicit.Ģ.3 Classical versus probabilistic.Ģ.5 Language-driven versus not language-driven.ġ.4 From challenges to precedents.Ģ.1 The need for flat-out belief.ģ.2 Dennett on the Joycean machine.Ĥ.1 Cohen on belief and acceptance.Ĥ.2 Strand 2 belief and acceptance.ġ.2 Tacit and implicit acceptancep.Ģ PREMISING AND THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE.ģ.1 The behavioural view again.ģ.3 The premising machine in action.ģ.5 Acceptancep and meta-representational belief.ġ.1 Doxastic and non-doxastic acceptancep.ġ.3 Belief as unrestricted acceptancep.ġ.4 Elucidations and objections.ġ.5 Desire and pursuit of the goal.Ģ.1 Meeting the Bayesian challenge.Ģ.2 Meeting Williams’s challenge.Ģ.3 Meeting Fodor’s challenge.Ģ.4 The role of consciousness.ģ.3 Self-knowledge and autonomy.ġ.1 The nature of the threat.ġ.2 The supermental response.Ģ.1 Ramsey, Stich, and Garon’s arguments.Ģ.2 Individual acquirability.ģ PROPOSITIONAL MODULARITY VINDICATED.ģ.2 Individual acquirability.ģ.4 Basic propositional modularity?.ġ THE CASE FOR CONCEPTUAL MODULARITY.Ģ CONCEPTUAL MODULARITY VINDICATED.Ģ.1 Supermental conceptual capacities.Ģ.4 Basic conceptual modularity?.ģ THE FUTURE OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY.ġ.1 Akrasia and the supermind.ģ.1 First-person authority as performative.Ĥ.2 Evolutionary and developmental psychology.
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